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The Reservation Gambling Fury: Modern Indian 
Uprising or Unfair Restraint on Tribal Sovereignty?* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1979 the Seminole Tribe of Florida became the first tribe in the 
nation to open a large-scale, high-stakes bingo operation. During the 
1980s, Indian-sponsored gambling-from bingo parlors to Las Vegas-style 
casinos-rapidly spread until one-third of the 330 reservations in the 
United States were participating. 1 In just a little over a decade, Indian 
gambling has become a financial windfall to more than 150 tribes across 
the nation. Although this windfall income has helped Indian tribes 
become self-sufficient through tribal economic development, Indian-
sponsored gambling has met with stiff opposition from states concerned 
with the criminal activity often associated with gambling. 
On October 17, 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulato-
ry Act (IGRA), a comprehensive piece of federal legislation that governs 
the operation of Indian gambling establishments. 2 The express purpose 
of the I GRA was to balance the Indians' interest in tribal sovereignty with 
the states' interest in guarding its citizens from corrupt gaming activities 
and organized crime infiltration. 3 Following the passage of the IGRA, 
confusion surrounding its interpretation led to initial court decisions 
favorable to tribes and resulted in a climate in which high-stakes, casino-
style gaming on Indian reservations flourished nationwide. 4 States 
watched helplessly as gaming activities invaded their borders to an extent 
not likely contemplated by Congress. As a result of the initial neglect of 
the legislative intent behind the Act,5 states have responded by asserting 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 6 Recently federal 
courts have responded with decisions that demonstrate a pattern of 
* Copyright <e 1996 by Brian M. Greene. 
1. Leah Lorber, State Rights, Tribal Sovereignty, and the "White Man's Firewater, "69 
IND. L. REV. 255, 257 (1993). 
2. 25 u.s.c. § 2700 (1988). 
3. S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3071, 3075 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 446]. 
4. Eric Swanson, The Reservation Gaming Craze, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 471 (1992). 
5. See infra part II.C.l. 
6. See infra part III.B. 
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deference to state sovereignty and of constraints on future reservation 
gambling.7 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INDIAN GAMING 
An examination of the evolution of Indian gaming reveals three 
distinct phases. The first phase was the birth of Indian gaming in 1979 
with the establishment of a large-scale, organized bingo facility by the 
Seminole Tribe in Florida. From that single facility, Indian gaming 
experienced explosive growth, spreading to over 100 reservations during 
the 1980s.8 
The second phase of the Indian gaming evolution was the attempt by 
states to assert their jurisdiction to either prohibit or regulate Indian 
gaming activities. Strong opposition by tribes to any attempted regulation 
by states resulted in judicial intervention and the development of case law 
governing these kinds of conflicts. 
The final and most significant phase of Indian gaming began with the 
enactment of the IGRA in 1988. The IGRA demonstrates Congress' intent 
to balance the interests of the three sovereigns-the individual, the state, 
and the tribe-while regulating Indian gaming activities. 
A. Gambling on or Near Reservations 
Following the immediate financial success of the Seminole Tribe's 
bingo operation, Indian-sponsored gambling exploded on tribal lands 
during the 1980s. By the mid-1980s, one-third of the nation's Indian 
reservations had some form of organized gambling. Exempt from state 
gambling and tax laws, Indian gambling operations brought millions of 
dollars to once economically depressed Indian communities. 
Revenue generated by Indian gaming activities has continued to grow 
at a phenomenal rate even in recent years. In 1991, Indian gaming 
operations generated more than $1.3 billion,9 growing to $6 billion in 
1992. 10 As tribes typically retain nearly one-third of the revenues as 
profit, they are becoming self-sufficient through tribal economic 
development, a goal announced by the Reagan administration in 1983. 11 
The hundreds of millions of dollars profited in recent years have made 
up for cuts in federal funding. Profits have gone toward health, 
7. /d. 
8. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3. 
9. Lorber, supra note 1, at 258. 
10. Amber J. Ahola, Call it Revenge of the Pequots, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 907,910 n.26 
(1993). 
11. Ronald Reagan, President's Message on Indian Policy (Jan. 24, 1983), in 19 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 98, 99. 
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education, and community development programs. Income from gambling 
has been used to pave roads, build sewer and water projects, and to fund 
community centers, college education, and chemical dependency 
programs. This prosperity stands in contrast to the situation just fifteen 
years ago, when seventy percent of reservation inhabitants were welfare-
dependant and living in trailers with two or three other families. 12 
On more than one occasion, reservation gambling has also been a 
boon to nearby economically depressed cities. When the St. Croix tribe 
opened a casino in Turtle Lake, Wisconsin, jobs and real estate 
development boomed and bank deposits at local banks jumped ten 
percent. 13 In Redwood Falls, Minnesota, another site of a reservation 
casino, unemployment during the recession of the early 1990s remained 
below two percent, homes sold within days of being listed, and new 
businesses moved to the area. 14 
But despite the apparent benefits of Indian gaming, state officials 
have raised concerns about immoral and criminal activity. Since tribal 
governments are not required to report large cash transactions, law 
enforcement authorities worry that reservation facilities will be used to 
launder drug money. Further, without regulation, there are dangers of 
games being rigged, payoffs not being made, and profits not being used 
to benefit the tribe. The detrimental impact that reservation gambling has 
on revenues from state-sanctioned gambling has been estimated at $15 
billion per year. 15 
But whether reservation gaming has actually had a detrimental impact 
on neighboring communities has yet to be proven. 16 In 1992, the 
Department of Justice reported that it found no widespread or successful 
effort by organized crime to infiltrate Indian gaming operations. In fact, 
the Department of Justice indicated that the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion had reported fewer than five open investigations of organized 
criminal activity involving Indian gaming. On the other hand, congestion, 
traffic accidents, and the need for police service increased after a casino 
was built near Redwood Falls, Minnesota. Also, in the Minneapolis-St. 
Paul area where tribes operate several casinos, membership in the local 
chapter of Gamblers Anonymous increased nearly sixfold in the past ten 
years and calls to the group's telephone hotline tripled during 1991 Y 
12. Lorber, supra note 1, at 258. 
13. /d. 
14. /d. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. 
17. /d. 
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Particularly appealing to tribes was the prospect of opening gambling 
operations in urban areas. Tribes sought to capitalize on provisions of 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, which allows the federal 
government to acquire off-reservation land and convert it into Indian land 
for the tribes' use and benefit. 18 This process generally leaves state and 
local governments with little or no control over activities that are 
potentially harmful to their communities. 
The states' concerns-and the tribes' potential for profit-increase 
dramatically when Indian gaming moves from the reservation to the 
cities. In addition to the social and criminal concerns, lands taken into 
trust for Indian tribes are removed from the reach of zoning and other 
land use regulations. Revenues generated by gaming activities are free 
from taxation, 19 and urban traffic problems are the city's responsibility 
to solve. State officials have unanimously felt that it was a terrible 
injustice to force communities to live with the detriments of organized 
gambling without reaping any of its direct benefits. Sensing this threat to 
state sovereignty and fearing that increased Indian gambling operations 
could be infiltrated by organized crime, various government agencies 
expressed the need for federal or state oversight of gaming activities, or 
both. 20 
B. Pre-IGRA Litigation 
As large-scale bingo games became commonplace in the early 1980s, 
states attempted to assert their jurisdiction on Indian reservations. The 
tribes' vigorous opposition to such attempts produced two important court 
decisions: Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth21 and California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians. 22 Both decisions utilized the civil-regulatory, 
criminal-prohibitory23 test for determining when a state could assert its 
jurisdiction over Indian gaming activities. Seminole and Cabazon 
provided the groundwork for the enactment of the IGRA, as well as 
useful insights into the analysis that would later be used by federal courts 
in litigation involving Indian gaming under the IGRA. 
18. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1992). This section states: "The Secretary of the Interior is 
authorized, in his discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or 
assignment, any interest in lands ... for the purpose of providing land for Indians .... Such 
lands ... shall be exempt from State and local taxation." 
19. 25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1992). 
20. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3. 
21. 658 F.2d 310 (Former 5th Cir. Unit B 1981). 
22. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
23. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (developing the civil-regulatory, 
criminal-prohibitory test for determining when a state has jurisdiction over Indian reservations). 
93] RESERVATION GAMBLING FURY 97 
1. Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth 
Shortly after the Seminole Tribe opened the nation's first large-scale 
reservation bingo operation in 1979, the county sheriff threatened arrests 
on the Seminole reservation. The Seminole Tribe sued the county, 
seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. 24 In holding for 
the Seminole Tribe, the court found that states do not generally have 
jurisdiction on Indian reservations unless specifically granted that 
jurisdiction by Congress. 25 However, under Public Law 83-280,26 
Congress gave certain states, including Florida, criminal jurisdiction over 
activities occurring on reservations. Although Florida had a statute 
regulating bingo, the State needed to show that bingo was prohibited 
through criminal sanctions. 27 Because the Florida statute allowed 
regulated bingo games, the court concluded that Florida's approach to 
bingo was civil-regulatory in nature rather than criminal-prohibitory. 
Therefore, the State could not assert its jurisdiction over the Seminole 
Tribe's bingo operations. 28 
After Seminole, tribes across the nation seized the opportunity to 
strike it rich with high-stakes bingo gaming. By 1988, more than 100 
tribal bingo facilities, grossing over $100 million, were in operation in 
states where bingo was not expressly prohibited by law. 29 Yet by the 
mid-1980s tribes were seeking to expand their gaming activities to include 
card games. This expansion produced another state challenge to tribal 
gambling. 
2. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians 
In response to the Cabazon Tribe's attempt to run a bingo and draw-
poker casino on its reservation, California threatened to subject the tribe 
to its criminal statues governing bingo, poker, and other card games. 30 
24. Seminole Tribe, 658 F.2d at 311. 
25. !d. at 312-13. 
26. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505 § 7, 67 Stat. 590 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162 
(1984) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976), repealed by Act of April11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 
§ 403(b), 82 Stat. 79 (1984)). The first section specifically granted to California, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Alaska criminal jurisdiction on the reservations. The second 
section allowed for state assumption of civil jurisdiction to the extent necessary to resolve 
private disputes between Indians and private citizens. The Act also granted to other states, 
including Florida, the right to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction by legislative enactment, 
and although this section was repealed by the Act of April 11, 1968, any concessions of 
jurisdiction made pursuant to the Act prior to its repeal were not affected. 
27. Seminole Tribe, 658 F.2d at 312-13. 
28. !d. at 315-16. 
29. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3. 
30. See generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
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When the Cabazon Tribe sought declaratory relief, the federal district 
court granted summary judgment against the State. 31 The case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Using the civil-regulatory, criminal-
prohibitory test relied on in Seminole, the Court affirmed the district 
court's decision. 32 Because California operated or allowed a state 
lottery, parimutuel horse-race betting, and bingo-and because the State 
failed to expressly prohibit poker-type card games-the Court reasoned 
that such games were presumably not contrary to the State's public 
policy. 33 The Court thus concluded that California had adopted a civil-
regulatory approach to gambling and could therefore not assert its 
jurisdiction over Cabazon tribal gambling operations. 34 
What Seminole had done for reservation bingo, Cabazon did for 
high-stakes, casino-style gambling. Seminole allowed tribes to operate 
bingo games in states where bingo was allowed but regulated. Cabazon 
seemed to support the notion that if a state allowed some types of gaming 
activities, a state's approach to gambling in general would be interpreted 
as civil-regulatory, absent express prohibitions of specific types of 
gaming. Together, these two cases created an atmosphere in which tribes 
impulsively expanded gaming operations across the nation. This environ-
ment led to the Congressional debate over regulation of these activities 
and ultimately to the enactment of the IGRA. 
C. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
1. Legislative History 
Congress first attempted to address the issue of regulating gambling 
on Indian lands in 1983 with House Bill 4566. Although the bill did not 
make it to the floor, it demonstrated what was necessary: a compromise 
of state, tribal, and federal interests in Indian gaming without overly 
infringing on tribal sovereignty. With this bill, Congress began to address 
the need for uniform regulation of Indian gaming commerce. 35 When 
it eventually enacted the IGRA in 1988, Congress' intent was "to provide 
a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means 
of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong 
tribal governments. "36 The IGRA was also intended to address states' 
31. ld. at 206. 
32. Id. at 211. 
33. Id. at 210. 
34. ld. at 211-14. 
35. Peter T. Glimco, The IGRA and the Eleventh Amendment: Indian Tribes are 
Gambling When They Try to Sue a State, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 193, 197 (1994); citing 
H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) and S. 902, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
36. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988). 
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concerns by preventing the infiltration of organized crime and other 
corrupting influences, to assure that gaming on Indian lands was 
conducted fairly and honestly, and to establish federal authority and 
standards over gaming. 37 
The IGRA's legislative history reveals that the strongest opposition 
to allowing any tribal regulation of Indian gaming came from states 
where many forms of gambling were already legal. 38 The logical 
inference is that the real focus of the debate centered on a fear that 
Indians, being free from most or all of the constraints placed upon 
existing gaming activities, would have an unfair competitive advantage 
against non-Indian gaming, resulting in injury to the states in the form of 
lost tax revenues. After all, absent Congressional consent a state may not 
impose a tax on property or activities on Indian lands. 39 
The IGRA was the outgrowth of several years of discussion and 
negotiation among tribes, states, the gaming industry, the executive 
branch, and Congress. 40 Congress considered the law enforcement 
concerns of tribes, states, the federal government, and "the need to 
fashion a means by which differing public policies of these respective 
governmental entities [could] be accommodated and reconciled. "41 The 
threat of the Courts intruding upon territory Congress considered its own 
was also a significant factor in Congress' decision to act. Congress 
believed that the Congress, not the judiciary, had the responsibility to 
balance the competing policy interests and to determine the framework 
for regulating gaming on Indian lands. 42 
When the IGRA was finally enacted in 1988, it was viewed by many 
legislators and Indians as being unfavorable to tribal interests. However, 
this proved not to be the case. The judiciary continued to construe Indian 
legislation in favor of the tribes, 43 as it had done in Seminole and 
Cabazon. 
37. /d. § 2702(2)-(3). 
38. See S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, at 5. 
39. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1976) (citing Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)). 
40. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, at 3071. 
41. /d. at 3076. 
42. /d. at 3073 ("[l]n the final analysis, it is the responsibility of the Congress, consistent 
with its plenary power over Indian affairs, to balance competing policy interests and to adjust, 
where appropriate, the jurisdictional framework for regulation of gaming on Indian lands."). 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) ("Congress' authority over Indian 
matters is extremely broad, and the role ofthe courts in adjusting relations between and among 
tribes and their members correspondingly restrained."). 
43. See infra part III.A. 
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2. The Provisions of the IGRA 
With the IGRA, Congress divided gambling into three classes, each 
class subject to differing degrees of tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction 
and regulation. Class I gaming is defined to include social and traditional 
Indian games played for minimal prizes by individuals at tribal ceremo-
nies and gatherings. 44 Class I games are under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the tribes. 45 
Class II gaming is defined as bingo and games similar to bingo such 
as pull-tabs, lotto, tip-jars, punch boards, and instant bingo. Class II 
gaming also includes electronic, computer, or other technological aids 
used in connection with these bingo-type games.46 Certain card games 
operated by Indians in four named states prior to May 1 , 1988 are also 
included in class II by virtue of a grandfather clause. 47 While it is 
within the jurisdiction of the tribes, class II gaming is legal only where 
such gaming is otherwise permitted within the state48 and is subject to 
oversight by the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), a federal 
agency created by the IGRA.49 
Class III gaming includes all other forms of gaming. 50 Such 
activity is legal only if the following criteria are met: (1) it is authorized 
by tribal resolution and approved by the chairman of the NIGC; (2) it is 
located in a state that permits such gaming for any purpose by any 
person, organization, or entity; and, (3) it is conducted in conformance 
with a tribal-state compact. 51 
The IGRA provides that any tribe having jurisdiction over lands upon 
which class III gaming is to be conducted must request that the state in 
which the lands are located enter into negotiations to create a compact 
governing class III games. The state, upon receiving such a request, is 
required under the IGRA to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to form 
such a compact.52 In the event that the state fails to negotiate a compact 
44. 25 u.s.c. § 2703(6) (1988). 
45. /d. § 2710(a)(1). 
46. /d. § 2703(7)(A)(i). 
47. /d. § 2703(7)(C). The grandfather clause provides that included in class II gaming 
are those card games played in the states of Michigan, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Washington that were actually played in those states by Indian tribes on or before May 1, 1988, 
"but only to the extent of the nature and scope of the card games that were actually operated 
by an Indian tribe in such [s]tate on or before such date, as determined by the Chairman." /d. 
48. /d. § 2710(b)(1)(A). 
49. /d. §§ 2704(a), (b)(l); 2710(b)(l) to (c). 
50. /d. § 2703(8). 
51. /d. § 2710(d)(l)(A)(I)-(l)(C). 
52. !d. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
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in good faith, the IGRA gives federal courts the jurisdiction to preside 
over actions initiated by Indian tribes. Upon a finding that a state has 
failed in its duty to negotiate in good faith, a court must order the state 
and tribe to conclude a compact within sixty days, or, in the event of an 
impasse, submit the dispute to a court-appointed mediator to select the 
governing compact. Finally, if the state refuses to consent to the 
mediator's compact within sixty days, the Secretary of the Interior will 
determine how gambling on Indian lands will be regulatedY 
III. RESERVATION GAMING UNDER THE IGRA 
A. Round One: The Tribes Attack 
Following the enactment of the IGRA, gaming activities on Indian 
reservations increased at a staggering pace. With the lack of regulations 
regarding the interpretation of the IGRA provisions, states were forced 
to resort to litigation to prevent Indian tribes from opening and operating 
full-scale casinos. The initial result was a series of court decisions that 
weighed heavily in favor of tribal gaming. Much to the dismay of the 
states, it appeared that if the states allowed even the most insignificant 
form of gambling, the state would be forced to negotiate and allow tribes 
within its borders to operate almost any form of gambling, even if it was 
different from that allowed by the state. 54 
I. Regulation or Prohibition? 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticuf5 became the first 
significant case to interpret the scope of the IGRA class III provision: 
gaming allowed for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity. 
The Pequots, already operating a class II bingo game in Connecticut, 
sought to enter into a compact with the State to permit class III high-
stakes games. The Pequots wanted to engage in the regular operation of 
casino-style games, such as "Las Vegas Nights," which the State 
permitted as fundraisers for certain non-profit organizations. 56 In accor-
dance with the IGRA, the tribe requested that the State enter into 
negotiations to form a compact. The State refused, claiming that the tribe 
only had the right to conduct "Las Vegas Nights" subject to the same 
regulations imposed by the State on non-profit organizations. The tribe 
53. !d. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(I). 
54. See infra part III.A.l. 
55. 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991). 
56. !d. at 1026 (allowing blackjack, poker, dice, roulette, etc. during charitable "Las 
Vegas Nights"). 
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subsequently filed suit against the State under the IGRA due to the State's 
failure to negotiate in good faith. 57 
A federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Pequot Tribe. The court held that by allowing certain non-profit entities 
to engage in "Las Vegas Nights," even though subject to tight regula-
tions, Connecticut's approach to gambling in general was civil-regulatory 
rather than criminal-prohibitory.58 The court found casino-style class 
III gaming to be a type of gaming allowed in Connecticut for any purpose 
by any individual, organization, or entity, and thus, required Connecticut 
to enter into negotiations to determine the extent of state regulations. 59 
As a result of this ruling, the Pequot Tribe is currently operating one of 
the largest tribal casinos in the nation, creating over 2,000 jobs and 
generating $100 million a year in revenue. 60 
Following Mashantucket, a federal district court handed down a 
ruling that struck fear into the leaders of thirty-six states then operating 
state lotteries. In Lac du Flambeau Indians of Lake Superior Chippewa 
v. Wisconsin, 61 the Flambeau Tribe requested negotiations with the State 
regarding the tribe's proposal to open a casino on their reservation. The 
State refused, objecting to the proposed gaming because Wisconsin 
expressly prohibited all forms of class III gaming except lotteries and on-
track parimutuel wagering. 62 The State argued that casino games were 
simply not allowed in Wisconsin for any purpose by any person, 
organization, or entity, within the meaning of the IGRA, and that the 
State should therefore not be required to negotiate a compact with the 
tribe. 63 The Flambeau Tribe, following the Cabazon rationale, argued 
that in determining whether a state's criminal laws would apply to 
reservation gaming, the court must analyze the state's policy toward 
gaming in general. 64 The court agreed with the tribe and concluded that 
the issue was not whether the particular games are allowed, but whether 
that state's public policy toward class III gaming in general is prohibitory 
or regulatory. The court went on to find that because Wisconsin 
57. /d. at 1027. 
58. /d. at 1031-32. 
59. /d. at 1032. The Pequot Tribe could not conduct these games without state oversight, 
but the tribe was not automatically subjected to the regulations imposed by the state on "Las 
Vegas Night" operations. 
60. Swanson, supra note 4, at 474. 
61. 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991). 
62. /d. at 483. 
63. /d. at 484-85. 
64. /d. at 485. If the policy of the state is to generally prohibit all forms of gambling, 
then the state's policy toward gambling is viewed as criminal-prohibitory. Alternatively, if the 
state permits some forms of gambling-even subject to strict regulations-the state's policy 
toward gambling is viewed as civil-regulatory. 
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permitted a state-run lottery, the State's general policy toward class III 
gaming was civil-regulatory in nature. The State was ordered to enter 
negotiations with the Flambeau to conclude a compact governing class III 
games. 65 
2. Class II or Class Ill? 
Under the IGRA it is advantageous for tribes to avoid the cumber-
some compact negotiation process required to conduct class III gaming. 
Tribes have attempted to circumvent this process by taking advantage of 
the confusion surrounding the Act and by introducing class III games 
under the guise of class II gaming. A major benefit of having an activity 
classified as class II gaming is that it is subject only to oversight by the 
NIGC, and is free from state regulation. Classifying a particular game as 
a class II game also allows tribes to offer the game immediately to the 
public. The existence of such advantages created a temptation for tribes 
to simply engage in illegal activity and wait for it to be challenged. 66 
The IGRA defines class II games as including bingo and bingo-like 
games such as pull-tabs. However, class II also includes electronic, 
computer, or other technological aids used in connection with these 
bingo-type games. 67 Using the ambiguous "technological aids" lan-
guage, tribes have sought out video machines that play like slot machines, 
which are class III games, but which could arguably be defended as class 
II "technological aids" to bingo. 68 Following conflicts in several states, 
the NIGC issued regulations that expressly classify specific video devices 
as class III games and not class II "technological aids. "69 
Another example of a common attempt to falsely classify a game is 
illustrated by the actions of the Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin.70 That tribe 
attempted to run a lottery without a compact. The State argued that 
lotteries are class III and not class II games. The Oneida Tribe operated 
two games on the reservation called "Big-Green" and "Cash-3." Both 
games would have players select a series of numbers at one dollar per 
play. Once a week tribal officials would randomly select numbers. 
Players whose numbers matched the ones selected by the tribe would win 
a jackpot, often amounting to $500,000 or more. 71 
65. /d. at 486. 
66. Swanson, supra note 4, at 476. 
67. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(a)(I) (1988). 
68. Swanson, supra note 4, at 476. 
69. 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (1995). 
70. See Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 742 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Wis. 1990). 
71. /d. at 1034-35. 
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When threatened with prosecution, the Oneida Tribe sought a 
declaratory judgment that the games were class II, not class III games 
and, therefore, were permissible without a compact with the State. The 
tribe argued that class II gaming explicitly allows "lotto," a term 
commonly used to refer to lotteries. The court was not persuaded. In 
holding for the State, the court found that all of the games defined to be 
class II were bingo, or bingo-like games where a board is used, numbers 
are called, and the first player with a winning sequence prevails. The 
"Big Green" and "Cash-3" games were found to be wholly different in 
kind from bingo. 72 The Oneida tribe was prohibited from operating 
these lotteries on the reservation without first seeking a compact with the 
State. 
3. The Grandfather Loophole 
Another method by which tribes attempted to circumvent class III 
requirements was through the IGRA's grandfather clause.73 The first 
IGRA ruling on a tribe's attempt to expand its gaming activities via the 
grandfather exception is found in Sisseton-Whapeton Sioux v. United 
States Department of Justice. 14 The Sioux Tribe had started a blackjack 
operation on a South Dakota reservation on April 15, 1988, just six 
months prior to the enactment of the IGRA, and before May 1, 1988-the 
threshold date for triggering the IGRA grandfather clause. The tribe 
made some changes to its operation by increasing the number of tables 
and hours of operation. The United States filed a suit against the Sioux, 
claiming that the expansion violated federal law. The federal court found 
that the IGRA grandfather clause did not apply to the tribe's blackjack 
games because the tribe had exceeded both the nature and the scope of its 
pre-May 1, 1988 activity, contrary to the requirements of the clause. 75 
But on appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, holding 
that the grandfather provision did apply because the tribe had not changed 
the "nature and scope" of its pre-May 1, 1988 operation. The court 
concluded that the only requirements necessary to satisfy the IGRA's 
"nature and scope" provision were that both the gambling operation and 
the specific games played must have been in place on or before May 1, 
1988.76 
72. Id. at 1037. 
73. See supra note 47 for language from the lORA grandfather clause. 
74. 718 F. Supp. 755 (D.S.D. 1989), rev'd, 897 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1990). 
75. Sisseton-Whapeton Sioux v. United States Dep't of Justice, 897 F.2d 358, 359 (8th 
Cir. 1990). 
76. Id. at 363. 
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It is important to understand the context in which this decision was 
made. The U.S. Supreme Court had developed the canons of construction 
that courts should broadly construe federal actions that establish or 
prescribe Indian rights and that courts must narrowly construe actions that 
limit Indian rights. 77 The entire basis for the initial post-IGRA status 
of reservation gaming was the liberal interpretation courts gave to the 
civil-regulatory, criminal-prohibitory test. 
Indian gaming was therefore continuing to flourish under the 
Supreme Court's early decisions. The fact that courts had been somewhat 
strict in their interpretation of what constitutes class II gaming had 
minimal effect because of the lax interpretation given to the grandfather 
clause and the strict enforcement of the IGRA provision requiring states 
to negotiate class III compacts with Indian tribes. 
B. Round Two: The States Retaliate with the 
Eleventh Amendment 
After repeated defeat in trying to challenge the regulatory /prohibitory 
dichotomy, states may have recently found a key to successfully 
restricting future growth in reservation gambling. That solution is found 
in the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. 
Despite the IGRA requirements that states negotiate in good faith to 
form regulatory compact agreements with Indian tribes wanting to engage 
in class III gaming, and despite the numerous instances where federal 
courts have compelled states to yield to that requirement, states continued 
to ignore Indian requests to engage in negotiations. Tribes predictably 
exercised their IGRA right to file suit against non-cooperative states, fully 
expecting a federal court would order the state to comply with the 
request. Beginning in the early 1990s states began to respond to such 
suits, not by arguing that their policy toward gambling was prohibitory 
as had been done unsuccessfully in the past, but with a new and more 
powerful argument. The new strategy, first employed by the State of 
Alabama in 1991/8 was for the state to simply make a motion to dismiss 
based on state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 79 
The immunity afforded states by the Eleventh Amendment precludes 
federal jurisdiction over states, with a few exceptions, in suits by state 
77. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 41 U.S. 164, 174 (1973)(ambiguous 
expressions must be resolved in favor of the Indians); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 
U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) (treaties must be construed to favor the Indians). 
78. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991). 
79. U.S. CaNST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). 
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citizens or citizens of foreign nations. Unless the IGRA's specific 
Congressional grant of federal court jurisdiction80 falls under one of the 
few exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment, the states' obligation to 
negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes for class III casino-style gaming 
activities will be unenforceable in federal court. 
Since 189081 courts have held that under the Eleventh Amendment 
states enter the federal system with their sovereignty intact, that the 
judicial authority in Article III82 is limited by state sovereignty, and that 
a state is not subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented to be 
sued, either expressly or in the plan of convention. 83 The courts today 
recognize two exceptions to a state's sovereign immunity: either a state 
can consent to suit or Congress can abrogate a state's immunity under 
some circumstances. Only when a state relinquishes its sovereign 
immunity by one of these two means is it subject to federal court 
jurisdiction, thereby alleviating the Eleventh Amendment prohibition. 
1. Consent 
Under our federal system of government, there are two ways a state 
can consent to federal court jurisdiction: an explicit consent to a 
particular lawsuit, and an implied consent deemed given by the state 
when it joined the Union and adopted the U.S. Constitution. 
a. Express Consent. If a state expressly consented to suit, the 
federal district court would have jurisdiction to rule on the tribe's claim 
under the IGRA. However, the issue of what constitutes express consent 
was a question that presented an initial obstacle. A federal district court 
resolved this question in Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama. 84 
The Poarch Band tribe filed suit in federal court to compel the State to 
enter into negotiations for class III gaming. The State answered and filed 
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress passed the IGRA pursuant to its power 
under the Indian Commerce Clause. Article I grants Congress power to regulate commerce with 
Indian tribes. The Indian Commerce Clause has since been interpreted as giving Congress 
"plenary power" (or "all that is required") over Indian affairs, including Indian tribes, their 
government, their members, and their property. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 
313, 319 (1978). 
81. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
82. Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in one 
supreme court and such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time establish. U.S. 
CONST. art. III. 
83. Ahola, supra note 10, at 916 (The theory behind consent inherent in the "plan of 
convention" is that the states, in ratifying Article I ofthe Constitution, ceded a portion of their 
sovereignty to the national government and created a limitation on their sovereign immunity 
in the "acceptance of the constitutional plan." (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-25 (2d ed. 1988)). 
84. 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991). 
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a motion to dismiss based on the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign 
immunity. The tribe argued that Alabama had expressly consented to suit 
because the Attorney General's office had asserted that it would intervene 
on behalf of the State if the State was not named as a party. 85 The court 
found that no express consent had been given because any consent or 
waiver on behalf of a state must come through legislative enactment, 86 
and the Alabama legislature had neither consented to the suit nor waived 
the State's immunity. 
At present, no state legislature has expressly waived its sovereign 
immunity in the IGRA context. With the current level of state opposition 
to Indian gaming within state borders, it is unlikely that any state will 
specifically surrender its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Those few 
states that do not currently oppose Indian gaming have opted to either 
negotiate in good faith for a regulatory tribal-state compact or to not 
assert the Eleventh Amendment as a defense in federal court. 87 Thus, 
no tribe has been successful, nor is any tribe likely to be successful, in 
suing a state under the IGRA pursuant to the express consent exception 
to the Eleventh Amendment. 
b. Implied Consent. Under the implied consent theory, states are 
considered to have waived their immunity by granting certain powers to 
the federal government when they entered the Union and adopted the 
Constitution. This waiver is referred to as the consent inherent in the plan 
of convention. The theory states that by entering a field of economic 
activity that is federally regulated, the state impliedly consents to be 
bound by that regulation and to be subject to suit in federal court. 88 
Two specific requirements must be met to invoke the doctrine. First, 
Congress must state its intention to subject states to suit in federal court 
through "unmistakably clear language." Second, the state must 
constructively or impliedly consent to suit by entering a field of economic 
activity that is federally regulated by accepting the benefits of such an 
activity. 
At least three different arguments have been made by tribes in the 
federal district courts asserting that the implied consent exception applied. 
First, a tribe might be able to sue a state on behalf of the United States 
because the states were not immune to suits by the federal government. 
Second, the states may have impliedly waived their immunity whenever 
Congress acted pursuant to its plenary powers under the Indian Com-
merce Clause. Third, the grant of federal court jurisdiction may be a 
85. !d. at 554. 
86. !d. 
87. Ahola, supra note 10, at 939. 
88. Blatchford v. Native Village of Naotak, 501 U.S. 775, 778 (1991). 
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valid waiver of immunity because Congress clearly stated its intent to 
subject states to suit in federal court and the states entered a field of 
federally regulated economic activity by accepting the benefits of the 
IGRA. 
i. Can Tribes Sue States on Behalf of the United States? Because 
states are not immune to suits by the United States, if a tribe sued a state 
in the representative capacity of the federal government, the state could 
not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. In Poarch Band, the tribe 
argued that its suit against Alabama was, in reality, a suit by the United 
States to which Alabama had no immunity. 89 The tribe argued that the 
IGRA allowed the Secretary of the Interior to file suit against a state to 
enforce the mediation process, and thus, their suit could actually have 
been brought by the United States. 
The Poarch Band court did not agree. The court found that under the 
IGRA, the tribe could not possibly be acting on behalf of the United 
States because the federal government could not sue a state for failure to 
negotiate in good faith. Rather, the court pointed out that the IGRA 
allowed the Secretary to bring a later action to enforce mediation 
procedures under the IGRA only after the state and tribe failed to reach 
an agreement. 90 In Poarch Band, as would necessarily be the case 
anytime a tribe brought an action for failure to negotiate in good faith, 
the action had not reached a point where the Secretary could become 
involved. Therefore, when suing under the IGRA, it is impossible for a 
tribe to meet the requisite condition that the action be the identical action 
that the United States could bring. Consequently, a tribe cannot qualify 
as a representative of the United States and thereby implicate the implied 
consent exception to sovereign immunity. 
ii. Wziver of Immunity When Congress Enacts Legislation Pursuant to 
the Indian Commerce Clause. If states waive their sovereign immunity 
in the plan of convention, whenever Congress enacts legislation pursuant 
to the Indian Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment would not be 
a bar to suit because the IGRA was enacted pursuant to the Indian 
Commerce Clause. In Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. 
Michigan, 91 the tribe made this argument. The tribe argued that a state 
would not be immune to any suit by an Indian tribe because the state had 
given up that right when it adopted the Constitution and accepted the 
Indian Commerce Clause. The court dismissed this argument, stating that 
89. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550,554 (S.D. Ala. 1991) 
(A waiver of immunity against suits by the United States has been held to be 
one type of consent inherent in the plan of convention.). 
90. !d. at 555. 
91. 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992). 
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Blatchford controlled. In Blatchford, the Supreme Court addressed the 
issue of whether states had generally waived their immunity to tribes 
through the plan of convention. The Court held that the states had not, 
noting that waiver of immunity would only be found against particular 
litigants in two contexts: suits by sister states, and suits by the United 
States. 92 The Court indicated that the states had surrendered their 
immunity from one another when they joined the convention, while 
tribes, on the other hand, were immune from suits by states. 93 The 
Court reasoned that "if the convention could not surrender the tribes' 
immunity for the benefit of the States, we do not believe that it surren-
dered the States' immunity for the benefit of the tribes. "94 The district 
court thus concluded that the "mutuality of immunity" doctrine discussed 
in Blatchford applied to suits by tribes arising under legislation enacted 
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause as well as to other types of suits 
by tribes. 95 
The Supreme Court's decision in Blatchford apparently precludes 
tribes from ever claiming any kind of waiver inherent in the plan of 
convention. Whether states had waived their immunity when Congress 
legislated pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause would thus have to be 
analyzed under the test the Court developed for an implied waiver: 
unmistakably clear intent by Congress and state entrance into a field of 
federally regulated economic activity. 
iii. Wziver of Immunity by Receiving Benefits Under the IGRA. If 
Congress' intent was unmistakably clear in the IGRA, and if the states 
are found to have entered a field of federally regulated economic activity 
by accepting the benefits of the IGRA, then, theoretically, the implied 
consent exception to the Eleventh Amendment allows tribes to sue states 
in federal district court. In Poarch Band the tribe argued that Alabama 
had waived its sovereign immunity by accepting the benefits of the 
IGRA. Because the IGRA clearly conditioned participation in the federal 
gaming program on a waiver of sovereign immunity, the tribe argued that 
both requirements of the implied consent doctrine had been satisfied.96 
Although the court agreed that there was no question that Congress had 
clearly expressed in the IGRA its intent to allow states to be sued by 
tribes in federal court, the court ultimately concluded that Alabama had 
not consented to suit under the implied waiver doctrine. 97 
92. Blatchford v. Native Village of Naotak, 501 U.S. 775, 780 (1991). 
93. !d. at 780-83. 
94. !d. at 782. 
95. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe, 800 F. Supp. at 1488. 
96. Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550, 556 (S.D. Ala. 1991). 
97. /d.at557. 
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The Poarch Band Tribe claimed that Alabama participated in the 
IGRA by negotiating to obtain jurisdiction over gaming activities on 
Indian land. Furthermore, Alabama had benefitted from its participation 
in the IGRA because the State would be able to sue the tribe and enforce 
state laws on tribal lands. The court refuted the tribe's arguments, stating 
that "the primary way for a state to subject itself to suit under the IGRA 
[was] to do nothing. 98 According to the court, even if Alabama had 
negotiated to some extent, mere negotiation under the IGRA fell far short 
of consent. "If simply engaging in negotiations is enough to constitute 
consent . . . the state was faced with [a] choice of negotiating and 
consenting to suit or refusing to negotiate and being sued for failure to 
negotiate. "99 The court concluded by stating that the implication of the 
IGRA was to compel states to negotiate, thereby making the act of 
negotiating involuntary and even less an act of consent. 100 States 
unable to freely choose to participate can hardly be said to have construc-
tively or impliedly waived their sovereign immunity. 
None of the arguments set forth above succeeded in persuading the 
court, which ultimately held that the requirements of the implied consent 
theory had not been met. Based on the above analysis, it seems unlikely 
that tribes can use the implied waiver exception to the Eleventh 
Amendment to bring suit against states under the IGRA. 
2. Abrogation 
One possible remaining approach available to tribes to sue states in 
federal court is the abrogation exception. In certain situations Congress 
has the ability to abrogate101 a state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity. Before Congress can act however, two requirements must be 
met. First, Congress must make its intent to subject states to suit in 
federal court unmistakably clear in a governing statue. Second, Congress 
must have the power to abrogate. 
a. Intent to Abrogate. There is little room for debate 
concerning Congress' intent to subject states to federal court jurisdiction 
under the IGRA. The IGRA states that U.S. district courts "shall have 
jurisdiction over any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising 
from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe 
98. /d. 
99. /d. 
100. /d. ("Upon receiving [a request to negotiate], the State shall negotiate with the Indian 
tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact." (citing 25 U .S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988)) 
(emphasis added)). 
101. To abrogate means to cancel or repeal by authority; to abolish. WEBSTER's NEW 
WORLD DICTIONARY 4 (3d ed. 1988). 
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for the purpose of entering into a tribal-state compact . . . or to conduct 
such negotiations in good faith . . . . " 102 Virtually every court faced 
with the issue of Congress' intent in the IGRA to subject states to federal 
court jurisdiction has held that Congress was unmistakably clear in that 
regard. 103 Courts have left no uncertainty surrounding Congress' intent 
by concluding that it would be "difficult to imagine a clearer statement 
of Congress' intent to subject states to lawsuits in federal court, "104 and 
that "Congress fully contemplated and expressed its desire to give the 
tribes a federal forum in which they could compel states to negotiate 
fairly with them." 105 
b. Power to Abrogate. Once it was settled that Congress had 
expressed an unmistakably clear intent in the language of the IGRA, the 
first prong of the abrogation test was met. The only remaining question 
was whether Congress had the power to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity. Until 1989, Supreme Court decisions had limited Congress' 
power to abrogate states' immunity to legislation enacted under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 106 In 1989, the Court held in Pennsyl-
vania v. Union Gas Co. 107 that Congress also has the authority to 
override states' immunity when legislating pursuant to the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. 108 However, the Court has yet to expressly extend 
this abrogation power to enactments pursuant to the Indian Commerce 
Clause, under which Congress enacted the IGRA. 109 The Court failed 
to specify whether their ruling was confined to the interstate commerce 
setting or whether it extended to the Indian commerce setting. 
Currently, five federal district courts have addressed the issue of 
whether Congress had the authority to abrogate states' sovereign 
immunity when it enacted the IGRA under the Indian Commerce Clause, 
Of the five, only the district court in Seminole Tribe v. State of Florida 
held that Congress had this authority. 110 However, in Poarch Band of 
102. 25 U .S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(I) (1988). 
103. Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1993); Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa 
Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. 550. 
104. Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at 558. 
105. Kickapoo, 818 F. Supp. at 1427. 
106. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
107. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
108. /d. at 13-23. 
109. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1992) (stating that the purpose for enacting the IGRA under 
the Indian Commerce Clause was "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by 
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong 
tribal government."). 
110. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 658 (holding that Congress did abrogate the states' 
immunity in enacting the IGRA and had the constitutional power to do so under the Indian 
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Creek Indians v. Alabama the court held that Congress does not have the 
power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when 
enacting legislation pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. 111 The 
Court noted that Union Gas, in which the Supreme Court recognized 
Congress' power to abrogate vis-a-vis the Interstate Commerce Clause, 
was merely a plurality decision. Thus, the Poarch Band court ruled that 
extending Union Gas to include Congressional abrogation power in 
legislative enactments under the Indian Commerce Clause would be an 
"unwarranted expansive application." 112 
The court also based its decision, in part, on the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico. 113 In Cotton Petro-
leum, the Supreme Court declared that the Interstate Commerce and 
Indian Commerce Clauses have very different applications. The court 
further stated that the extensive caselaw that the Interstate Commerce 
Clause has promulgated is a result of the unique role of the states in our 
constitutional government and does not adapt well to cases which involve 
the Indian Commerce Clause. 114 Thus, the Poarch Band court conclud-
ed that this implication of Cotton Petroleum, coupled with the narrow 
interpretation of Union Gas, required a conclusion that Congress did not 
have abrogation powers when it enacted the IGRA pursuant to the Indian 
Commerce Clause. 115 Three other courts, applying similar reasoning, 
reached the same conclusion as the Poarch Band court. 116 
Commerce Clause). 
111. 776 F. Supp. at 557-62. 
112. /d. at 559. 
113. 490 u.s. 163 (1989). 
114. See id. at 192 (stating that the case law developed under the Interstate Commerce 
Clause should not be binding authority on cases brought under the Indian Commerce Clause). 
115. The Poarch Band court stated: 
Because Union Gas is not directly on point, and with an eye toward the 
shaky ground on which it stands, this Court does not find the decision to be 
_ controlling. The weakness of the plurality opinion leads this Court to believe 
that it should not be given an expansive application and that, read narrowly, 
it does not require a determination that Congress had the power to abrogate 
Alabama's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted the [IGRA]. 
Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp at 558. 
116. SeeSpokaneTribev. Washington, 790F. Supp. 1057,1060-61 (E.D. Wash. 1991) 
(holding that it was inappropriate to apply theories from the Interstate Commerce Clause to the 
Indian Commerce Clause); Blatchford v. Native Village of Naotak, 501 U.S. 775, 780-82 
(1991) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred an action brought by an Indian tribe 
against a state because the state did not surrender this immunity when it adopted the 
Constitution); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp. 1484, 
1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that Congress lacked authority to abrogate the states' 
immunity because when the states formed the Union they implicitly agreed to Congress' 
abrogation authority only under the Interstate Commerce Clause). 
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The nearly unanimous consensus among federal courts is that Union 
Gas should not have an expansive application until the Supreme Court 
gives further guidance regarding exactly what the decision meant and 
where it was leading. 117 At this time, there has been no clear message 
from the Supreme Court regarding Congress' power to abrogate state 
immunity under any Article I power. Had the Court intended Congress' 
power to abrogate state immunity to extend beyond the context of the 
Interstate Commerce Clause to the context of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, it could have easily included language to that effect in Union 
Gas. Thus, the Supreme Court's failure to provide the guidance desired 
by lower courts, coupled with the Court's discussion in Cotton Petro-
leum, 118 lends support to the position that the Court's ruling in Union 
Gas was not intended to extend Congress' abrogation power to legislation 
enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF INDIAN GAMING UNDER 
THE IGRA 
The trend in federal court decisions during the early 1990s to move 
from the prohibitory-regulatory test to the application of consent and 
abrogation analysis has preserved state sovereignty in the domain of high-
stakes casino-style gambling. Where once it appeared that states would 
have no defense against the flood of new tribal gaming activities, states 
may once again have the upper hand in determining what type of gaming 
activities are conducted within their borders. 
Recent court decisions have frustrated the IGRA's attempt at 
balancing Indian and state interests. The current status of the IGRA fails 
to provide Indian tribes a forum in which to raise allegations of state non-
cooperation. As previously discussed, the Eleventh Amendment bars a 
tribe's action against a state under the IGRA because Congress enacted 
the IGRA pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. 119 Furthermore, 
federal district courts are unable to assert jurisdiction over an Indian 
tribe's IGRA claim based on the exceptions to state sovereign immuni-
ty.l2o 
Congress could have avoided this jurisdiction problem if it had 
simply enacted the IGRA under the Interstate Commerce Clause instead 
of the Indian Commerce Clause. Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, 
Congress has the power to regulate all commerce or activity that affects 
117. Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at 559. 
118. See supra notes 112 and 113 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra note 108. 
120. See supra parts II.B.1 and III.B.2. 
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more than one state. Because the power to regulate interstate commerce 
is broadly interpreted, and gambling on Indian reservations depends upon 
goods and visitors from outside the state, Indian gaming falls within the 
scope of interstate commerce and is thus subject to Congressional control. 
Theoretically, Congress could resolve the confusion and controversy 
surrounding the IGRA by amending the Act with a simple statement 
indicating a Congressional intent that the IGRA be re-enacted pursuant to 
Congress' authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 
Alternatively, the Supreme Court may soon decide to indulge the 
lower courts and rule on the applicability of its decision in Union Gas. 
Should the Court adopt the majority interpretation of the lower courts 121 
under the IGRA, Congress would unquestionably lack the power to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and thus 
any suit by an Indian tribe could be repelled. Conversely, should the 
Court adopt the minority interpretation of the Seminole court122 and 
expressly extend Congress' power to abrogate state immunity in the 
Indian commerce clause context, continued assertion by states of the 
sovereign immunity defense to suits by Indian tribes would become futile. 
There is a third possible solution that requires no additional action 
by Congress or the Supreme Court. Under the current structure of the 
IGRA, if all provisions fail to produce a class III gaming compact 
between a state and Indian tribe, the question regarding regulation reverts 
to the Secretary of the Interior who must prescribe procedures under 
which class III gaming may be conducted. 123 Although a prerequisite 
to this event is a suit against the state by an Indian tribe, 124 where the 
sovereign immunity defense would prevail, action by the federal govern-
ment against a state is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 125 This 
solution, however, is not desirable because it is at the mercy of the 
policies of the executive branch which are subject to change every four 
years. An administration sympathetic to state sovereignty would likely 
produce a very restrictive compact and conversely, an administration 
partial to tribal sovereignty would likely produce an extremely liberal 
compact. This potential inconsistency would only create additional 
opportunities for both Congress and the judiciary to intervene and further 
muddy the waters. 
121. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
123. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (1988). 
124. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(D)(3)(A) (1988). 
125. See supra note 79. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The IGRA is still in its infancy and many important issues remain 
unresolved. However, at this time it is apparent that states must be 
allowed latitude in prohibiting or regulating class III gaming activities, 
especially where such activities are strictly regulated or prohibited by 
state policy. Class I and class II activities, because of their relatively 
harmless nature, are left to the jurisdiction of the tribes with only 
moderate oversight of class II activities by the NIGC. Class III activities, 
though, present very real concerns, especially in states that currently 
disdain such activities. Recognizing this, Congress enacted the IGRA as 
a means of balancing the tribes' interest in autonomy with the states' 
interest in exercising their police powers for the protection of their 
citizens. 126 
The IGRA was never intended to prevent class III gambling on 
Indian reservations. It was intended, rather, through the cooperative 
efforts of the tribes, the federal government, and the states, to allow 
adequate exercise of tribal sovereignty while ensuring sufficient protection 
against unscrupulous gambling operations. Because of failed cooperation 
between these three sovereigns, the Congressional intent of the Act is not 
being realized. Casinos have been permitted to open in states where 
gambling is generally prohibited, and have been prevented from opening 
in states where gambling is generally permitted and regulated. 
The current adversarial relationship between tribes and states-and 
the inconsistency demonstrated by the judiciary-will inevitably force 
future action in this area. In fact, events that are likely to shape the future 
of Indian gaming have already commenced. Legislation prompted by state 
officials concerned about the enormous increase in reservation gaming 
was recently introduced in Congress by Representative Gerry Solomon 
of New York. 127 Although it is still too early to know Congress' 
intentions, Indian gaming officials fear that Congress will overhaul the 
IGRA and thereby weaken tribes' leverage in negotiating gambling 
compacts with states and give states greater latitude in limiting what 
games can be played on reservations. 128 
Of major significance in the judicial context is the recent grant of 
certiomri by the Supreme Court in an Indian gaming case. 129 In 
126. SeeS. REP. No. 446, supra note 3, 3072-73. 
127. Jim Specht, Indian Gaming Leaders Fear Reversals Under GOP, GANNETT NEWS 
SERVICES, Jan. 18, 1995. 
128. ld. 
129. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994}, cert. 
granted, 63 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Jan 23, 1995) (No. 94-12). 
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Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of Florida, 130 a consolidation of two 
appeals from district courts in Florida and Alabama, the Eleventh Circuit 
ruled that the states' Eleventh Amendment defenses were valid because 
Congress lacked the authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity 
when it enacted the IGRA pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. This 
decision is significant for two reasons. First, it marks the first time that 
a federal court other than a district court has ruled on the validity of the 
Eleventh Amendment defense and Congress' power to abrogate state 
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause. Second, this decision 
prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiomri. The Court heard oral 
arguments on October 11, 1995, and at this writing a decision is still 
pending. 131 
Whatever course of action the future holds-whether legislative or 
judicial, restrictive or expansive-it is unlikely that the competing 
interests can be balanced to the satisfaction of all sides. Nor is it likely 
that future action will permanently resolve the present conflict. The 
interests are simply too diverse. On one side are the fundamental interests 
of tribal sovereignty and economic independence of Indian tribes who 
claim that Indian-government relations are a tribal-federal issue based on 
the concept of sovereign to sovereign. On the other side are the equally 
vital interests of state sovereignty, public safety, and social stability, 
advanced by states who feel their autonomy is being compromised. In this 
conflict of tribe versus state and wealth versus supremacy, justice 
ultimately demands that adequate consideration be given to the largest 
group of potential victims or beneficiaries, the American public, who so 
far seem the silent and forgotten player in this debate. 
Brian M. Greene 
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